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Abstract
We examine the problem of clearing day-ahead electricity market auctions where each
bidder, whether a producer or consumer, can specify a minimum profit or maximum pay-
ment condition constraining the acceptance of a set of bid curves spanning multiple time
periods in locations connected through a transmission network with linear constraints. Such
types of conditions are for example considered in the Spanish and Portuguese day-ahead
markets. This helps describing the recovery of start-up costs of a power plant, or analo-
gously for a large consumer, utility reduced by a constant term. A new market model is
proposed with a corresponding MILP formulation for uniform locational price day-ahead auc-
tions, handling bids with a minimum profit or maximum payment condition in a uniform and
computationally-efficient way. An exact decomposition procedure with sparse strengthened
Benders cuts derived from the MILP formulation is also proposed. The MILP formulation
and the decomposition procedure are similar to computationally-efficient approaches previ-
ously proposed to handle so-called block bids according to European market rules, though
the clearing conditions could appear different at first sight. Both solving approaches are also
valid to deal with both kinds of bids simultaneously, as block bids with a minimum acceptance
ratio, generalizing fully indivisible block bids, are but a special case of the MP bids introduced
here. We argue in favour of the MP bids by comparing them to previous models for minimum
profit conditions proposed in the academic literature, and to the model for minimum income
conditions used by the Spanish power exchange OMIE.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Minimum profit conditions and Near-Equilibrium in non-convex
day-ahead electricity auctions
Day-ahead electricity markets are organized markets where electricity is traded for the 24 hours
of the next day. They can take the form of single or two sided auctions (pool with mandatory
participation to match forecast demand or auctions confronting elastic offer and demand). The
prices set in day-ahead markets are used as reference prices for many electricity derivatives, and
such markets are taking more importance with the ongoing liberalization and coupling of electricity
markets around the world in general, and in Europe in particular.
Clearing these auctions amounts to finding - ideally- a partial equilibrium using submitted bids
describing demand and offer profiles, depending on the utility, production costs and operational
constraints of market participants. A market operator, typically power exchanges in Europe, is in
charge of computing a market clearing solution.
It is well-known that for a well-behaved convex welfare optimization problem where strong duality
holds, duality theory provides with equilibrium prices. However, to describe their operational
constraints or cost structure, participants can specify for example a minimum output level of
production (indivisibilities), or that the revenue generated by the traded power at the market
clearing prices should cover some start-up costs if the plant is started. Similar bids could be
specified for the demand side. This leads to the study of partial market equilibrium with uniform
prices where indivisibilities and fixed costs must be taken into account, deviating from a well-
behaved convex configuration studied in classical microeconomic textbooks, e.g. in [14]. The need
for bidding products introducing non-convexities is due in particular to the peculiar nature of
electricity and the non-convexities of production sets of the power plants.
When considering a market clearing problem with non-convexities such as indivisibilities (so-called
block bids in the Pan-European PCR market [3]), or start-up cost recovery conditions (so-called
complex bids with a minimum income condition also called MIC bids in PCR), most of the time
no market equilibrium exists, see e.g. the toy example in Section 2.1 for an instance involving
MIC bids, and in [11] for an instance involving block bids.
Let us also mention that in coupled day-ahead electricity markets, representation of the network is
a particularly important matter. Aside the potential issues due to the simplifications or approxi-
mations made to represent a whole network, it is of main importance for participants to understand
clearly the reason for price differences occurring between different locations. Economically speak-
ing, locational prices should ideally form a spatial equilibrium, as historically studied in [2, 19],
which could equivalently be interpreted as requiring optimality conditions for TSOs, relating lo-
cational price differences to the scarcity and marginal prices of transmission resources.
Near-equilibrium under minimum profit conditions in uniform price day-ahead electricity auctions
is the main topic of the present contribution, and is also considered in references [3, 8, 7, 6, 18],
which are discussed in Section 3.1 below.
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1.2 Contribution and structure of this article
The main contribution of the present paper is to show how to handle minimum profit (or maximum
payment) conditions in a new way which turns out to generalize both block orders with a minimum
acceptance ratio used in France, Germany or Belgium, and, mutatis mutandis, complex orders
with a minimum income condition used in Spain and Portugal. The new approach consists in new
bids, which we call MP bids (for minimum profit or maximum payment), and the corresponding
mathematical programming formulation is a MILP modelling all the corresponding market clearing
conditions without any auxiliary variables, similar to an efficient MIP formulation previously
proposed for block orders [10]. An efficient Benders decomposition with sparse strenghtened cuts
similar to the one proposed in [10] is also derived. These MP bids hence seem an appropriate tool
to foster market design and bidding products convergence among the different regions which form
the coupled European day-ahead electricity markets of the Pan-European PCR project.
We start by providing in Section 2.1 a toy example illustrating the key points dealt with in the
reminder of the article. It illustrates the issues arising when considering minimum profit conditions,
and alternatives to take them into account in the computation of market clearing solutions. We
describe in Section 2.2 the notation used and a basic ’unrestricted’ welfare maximization problem
where such minimum profit conditions are first not enforced, also recalling the nice equilibrium
properties which would hold in a convex market clearing setting.
Section 3 is devoted to modelling minimum profit conditions or more generally MP conditions,
as with the approach proposed, the statement of a maximum payment condition for demand-side
orders is formally identical. After reviewing previous contributions considering minimum profit
conditions, we derive economic interpretations for optimal dual variables of a welfare maximization
program where an arbitrary MP bids combination has been specified. We then develop the core
result, showing how to consider MP bids in a computationally-efficient way, relying on previous
results to provide a MILP formulation without complementarity constraints nor any auxiliary
variable to model these MP conditions. Section 4 shows how to adapt all results when ramping
constraints of power plants are considered.
Section 5 derives from the MILP formulation provided in Section 3 a Benders decomposition
procedure with locally strengthened Benders cuts. These cuts are valid in subtrees of a branch-
and-bound solving a primal welfare maximization program, rooted at nodes where an incumbent
should be rejected because no uniform prices exist such that MP conditions are all satisfied. They
complement the classical Benders cuts which we show to correspond indeed to ’no-good cuts’
basically rejecting the current MP bids combination, and which are globally valid.
Numerical experiments are presented in Section 6. Implementations have been made in Ju-
lia/JuMP [9] and are provided together with sample datasets in an online Git repository [12].
They show the efficiency and merit of the new approach, in particular compared to the current
practice in OMIE-PCR.
3
Figure 1: Marginal cost/utility curves (see Table 1 for related start-up costs)
2 Near-equilibrium and minimum profit conditions
2.1 Position of the problem: a toy example
In the following toy example, a bid curve (in blue) represents some elastic demand. To satisfy this
demand, there are two offer bids from two plants, each having different start-up costs (100 EUR
and 200 EUR respectively), but the same marginal cost of 10 EUR / MW. Both plants bid their
marginal cost curve and their start-up cost to the auctioneer.
Neglecting first the minimum income conditions stating that all costs should be recovered for online
plants (i.e. both start-up and marginal costs), we can clear the market auction by matching the
aggregated marginal costs (resp. utility) bid curves, as done in the left part of Figure 2. In that
case, the determined market clearing price would be 10 EUR /MW, and obviously, both power
plants won’t recover their costs for that market clearing price.
However, if we allow the potentially paradoxical rejection of bids involving startup-costs, which
is also tolerated in all previous propositions considering minimum profit conditions exposed in
[3, 6, 8, 7, 18], then a ’satisfactory solution’ could be obtained by either rejecting bid B or bid
C. In that case, matching marginal cost/utility curves as in the right Figure 2, we see that the
market clearing price will rise to 50 EUR / MW and that, whatever the chosen offer B or C, the
corresponding plant will recover all its costs. Similar examples could be given for demand bids
with a maximum payment condition.
These observations help understanding why it is not possible to get a market equilibrium such that
all MP conditions are satisfied. It may be required to expel some bids from the market clearing
solution that would be profitable for the market clearing prices obtained in that situation. On the
other hand, including such ’paradoxically rejected bids’ would modify prices such that the MP
condition of some bid would not be satisfied any more.
The second point is that, even if in both matchings the costs are recovered for the chosen plant,
both matchings are not equivalent from a welfare point of view if we include fixed costs in the
computation of the welfare.
Under current OMIE-PCR market rules, both matching possibilities are not distinguished because
fixed costs are not included in the welfare maximizing objective function which only considers
4
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Figure 2: Matching MP bids
Bids Power (MW) Limit price (EUR/MW) Start-up costs
D1: Demand bid 1 11 50 -
D2: Demand bid 2 14 10 -
MP1: Offer MP bid 1 10 10 100
MP2: Offer MP bid 2 10 10 200
Table 1: Toy market clearing instance
marginal costs (resp. utility) of selected plants (resp. consumers). In such a case, welfare is
considered to be 400 whatever the chosen matching. Let us note that in the same way, in [8], the
fixed costs that should be recovered are not included in the welfare objective.
If we pay attention to fixed costs when computing welfare, matching MP1 yields a welfare of 300
while matching MP2 yields a welfare of 200. Such a choice in terms of inclusion of fixed costs in
the welfare objective function is similar to what is done in [18].
2.2 Unrestriced welfare optimization
Notation used throughout the text is provided here for quick reference. The interpretation of any
other symbol is given within the text itself.
Notation and Abbreviations
Abbreviations:
MP bids Stands for bids with either a minimum profit or a maximum payment condition
MIC bids Stands for complex orders with a minimum income condition used in OMIE-PCR
ITM Stands for ’in-the-money’
ATM Stands for ’at-the-money’
OTM Stands for ’out-of-the-money’
Sets and indices:
5
Market Price Revenue Costs Profits
MP1 MP2 MP1 MP2 MP1 MP2
Matching MP1 & MP2 10 100 100 200 300 -100 -200
Matching MP1 50 500 0 200 0 300 0
Matching MP2 50 0 500 0 300 0 200
Table 2: Market outcomes
i Index for hourly bids, in set I
c Index for MP bids, in set C
hc Index for hourly bids associated to the MIC bid c, in set Hc
l Index for locations, l(i) (resp. l(hc)) denotes the location of bid i (resp. hc)
t Index for time slots, t(i) (resp. t(hc)) denotes the time slot of bid i, (resp. hc)
Ilt ⊆ I Subset of hourly bids associated to location l and time slot t
HClt ⊆ HC Subset of MP hourly suborders, associated to location l and time slot t
Parameters:
Qi, Qhc Power amount of hourly bid i (resp. hc),
Q < 0 for sell bids, and Q > 0 for demand bids
rhc ∈ [0, 1] minimum ratio parameter used to express minimum output levels
P i, Phc Limit bid price of hourly bid i, hc
am,k Abstract linear network representation parameters
wm Capacity of the network resource m
Fc Start-up or fixed cost associated to bid c
Primal decision variables:
xi ∈ [0, 1] fraction of power Qi which is executed
xhc ∈ [0, 1] fraction of power Qhc (related to the MIC bid c) which is executed
uc ∈ {0, 1} binary variable conditioning the execution or rejection of the MP bid c
(i.e. of the values of xhc)
nk variables used for the abstract linear network representation, related to net export positions
Dual decision variables:
pilt locational uniform price of electricity at location l and time slot t
vm ≥ 0 dual variable pricing the network constraint m,
si ≥ 0 dual variable interpretable as the surplus associated to the execution of bid i ∈ I
smaxhc ≥ 0 dual variable related to the (potential) surplus associated to the execution of bid hc
sminhc ≥ 0 dual variable related to the (potential) surplus associated to the execution of bid hc
sc ≥ 0 dual variable interpretable as the surplus associated to the execution of the MP bid c
A classical hourly order corresponds to a step of a stepwise offer or demand bid curve relating
accepted power quantities to prices. For each such step, the variable xi ∈ [0, 1] denotes which
fraction of this step will be accepted in the market clearing solution. In the same way, variables
6
xhc denote these accepted fractions for bid curves associated to a bid with a minimum profit
condition or maximum payment condition (MP bids).
Concerning these MP bids, binary variables uc are introduced to model the conditional acceptance
of a set of hourly bids hc ∈ Hc, controlled via constraints (3), while constraints (4) enforce
minimum acceptance ratios where applicable. They are used for example to model minimum power
outputs of power plants. The conditional acceptances will be expressed as price-based decisions
(as called in [21] [5]) using the primal-dual formulation developed in Section 3.2, involving both
quantity and price variables. Parameters Fc correspond to fixed/start-up costs incurred if the MP
bid is accepted. Let us also note that a block bid spanning multiple time periods as described
in [3, 13, 10] could be described as an MP bid c by using a suitable choice of associated bid
curves and minimum acceptance ratios, and setting the corresponding fixed cost parameter Fc
to 0 in (1). It turns out that in such a case, minimum profit or maximum payment conditions
as described below will exactly correspond to the European market clearing conditions for block
orders described in [3, 13, 10], essentially stating that no loss should be incurred to any accepted
block bid, but allowing some block bids to be paradoxically rejected.
Constraint (6) is the balance equation at location l at time t, where the right-hand side is the
net export position expressed as a linear combination of abstract network elements. Constraint
(7) is the capacity constraint of the abstract network resource m. This abstract linear network
representation covers e.g. DC network flow models or the so-called ATC and Flow-based models
used in PCR (see [3]). The usual network equilibrium conditions involving locational market prices
apply, as they will be enforced by dual and complementarity conditions (14), (20), see [10].
The objective function aims at maximizing welfare. For the sake of conciseness, we do not consider
ramping constraints of power plants in the main parts of the text, though they can straightfor-
wardly be included in all the developments carried out, as shown in Section 4.
UWELFARE:
max
x,y,u,n
∑
i
(P iQi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)xhc −
∑
c
Fcuc (1)
subject to:
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xi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I [si] (2)
xhc ≤ uc ∀h ∈ Hc, c ∈ C [smaxhc ] (3)
xhc ≥ rhcuc ∀h ∈ Hc, c ∈ C [sminhc ] (4)
uc ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ C[sc] (5)∑
i∈Ilt
Qixi +
∑
hc∈HClt
Qhcxhc
=
∑
k
ekl,tnk, ∀(l, t) [pil,t] (6)∑
k
am,knk ≤ wm ∀m ∈ N [vm] (7)
xi, uc ≥ 0, (xhc free) (8)
u ∈ Z (9)
2.3 Dual and complementarity conditions of the continuous relaxation
We denote by UWELFARE-CR-DUAL the dual of the continuous relaxation of the welfare maxi-
mization program stated above.
UWELFARE-CR-DUAL:
min
∑
i
si +
∑
c
sc +
∑
m
wmvm (10)
subject to:
si +Qipil(i),t(i) ≥ QiP i, ∀i [xi] (11)
(smaxhc − sminhc ) +Qhcpil(hc),t(hc) = QhcPhc, ∀h ∈ Hc, c [xhc] (12)
sc ≥
∑
h∈Hc
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc )− Fc, ∀c ∈ C [uc] (13)∑
m
am,kvm −
∑
l,t
ekl,tpil,t = 0 ∀k ∈ K [nk] (14)
si, sc, shc, vm ≥ 0 (15)
Complementarity conditions:
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si(1− xi) = 0 ∀i ∈ I (16)
smaxhc (uc − xhc) = 0 ∀h, c (17)
sminhc (xhc − rhcuc) = 0 ∀h, c (18)
sc(1− uc) = 0 ∀c ∈ C (19)
vm(
∑
k
am,knk − wm) = 0 ∀m ∈ N (20)
xi(si +Qipil(i),t(i) −QiP i) = 0 ∀i ∈ I (21)
uc(sc −
∑
h∈Hc
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc ) + Fc) = 0 ∀c ∈ C (22)
As it is well-known, these dual and complementarity conditions, which are optimality conditions
for the continuous relaxation of (1)-(9) denoted UWELFARE-CR, exactly describe the nice equi-
librium properties we would like to have for a market clearing solution. This could be easily seen
from the economic interpretations given in Lemmas 1,2, 4 and Theorem 1 below.
Hence, equilibrium and integrality conditions for u cannot be both satisfied unless the continuous
relaxation UWELFARE-CR admits a solution which is integral in u. In the particular case where
there is no fixed cost (∀c ∈ C,Fc = 0), no minimum acceptance ratios (rhc = 0 for all hc ∈
Hc, c ∈ C), and there is no condition restraining the conditional acceptances modelled by the
binary variables uc via constraints (3), it is always optimal to set all uc := 1 and the problem
amounts to solving a classical convex market clearing problem where equilibrium can be found
which optimizes welfare.
Also, even setting Fc := 0 in (1), adding MP conditions to the constraints (2)-(9), (11)-(22) to deal
with them as in OMIE-PCR (cf. the toy example above with the remark about distinguishable
cases, and also Section 3.3) would in most cases render the problem infeasible. Hence, equilibrium
restrictions must be relaxed, and this can be done in different ways, which is the topic of the next
section.
3 Modelling Near-equilibrium with MP Conditions
Section 3.1 reviews previous propositions to handle minimum profit conditions, including the
current practice in OMIE-PCR, while Section 3.2 proposes a new approach which seems to be both
more appropriate economically speaking, and computationally more efficient. Section 3.3 makes
further technical comparisons between the current OMIE-PCR practice and the new proposition,
and recalls an exact linearisation for minimum income conditions used by OMIE proposed in a
previous contribution. Ramping conditions are not explicitely considered here, but Section 4 shows
how all results could be derived when these are included as well in the models.
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3.1 Modelling minimum profit conditions: literature review
As stated above, when one considers MP conditions or indivisibilities, it is needed to relax market
equilibrium conditions to get feasible solutions. A first idea to relax these equilibrium conditions
is to relax the complementarity conditions (16)-(22) while making them satisfied as closely as
possible. With the present context and notation, the proposition in [8] is essentially to minimize
the slacks, i.e. the deviations from 0, of the left-hand sides in (16)-(22), while adding ad-hoc
non-convex quadratic constraints guaranteeing non-negative profits for producers, which are then
approximated with linear constraints. The idea is generalized in [6] which also considers the
possibility of relaxing integrality conditions and to minimize a weighted sum of deviations from
complementarity, of deviations from integrality (which could be required to be null), and of up-
lift variables included in the statement of the minimum profit conditions, corresponding to side
payments to ensure revenue adequacy for producers. Leaving aside relaxation of integrality condi-
tions and uplifts, to minimize deviations from complementarity, for each left-hand side expression
gl ≥ 0, slack variables l are added together with constraints l ≥ gl, and the sum of the l is
minimized. Let us note that in the models considered, the fixed costs involved in the minimum
profit conditions are not part of the welfare maximizing function in [8], while they are included in
the welfare in [6].
The model and idea suggested in [6] is considered further in [18], where there is no uplift variable
in the statement of minimum profit conditions, therefore requiring revenue adequacy from the
uniform market prices only, and where it is observed that minimizing the slacks amounts to
minimizing the duality gap given with our notation by (10) minus (1), subject to primal and dual
constraints (2)-(15). The contribution [18] observes that this is a significant improvement over the
formulation proposed in [6].
In all these propositions, the choice is made to use uniform prices, to ensure minimum profit
conditions for producers, and to minimize the deviations from a market equilibrium by minimizing
the sum of slacks of all complementarity conditions. In such a case, there is no control on which
deviations from market equilibrium are allowed, and in particular, network equilibrium conditions
which correspond to optimality conditions of TSOs are often not satisfied.
In the Pan-European PCR market, the choice has been made to ensure network equilibrium
conditions as well as equilibrium conditions for all ’classical convex bids’ corresponding to steps of
classical bid curves. The only allowed deviations from a market equilibrium are that some ’non-
convex bids’ involving minimum power output constraints or minimum profit (resp. maximum
payment) conditions could be paradoxically rejected as in the toy example given above in Section
2.1. Let us note that such a ’paradoxical rejection’ is also allowed in all other propositions.
Concerning complex bids with a minimum income condition used in OMIE-PCR [3, 4], minimum
profit conditions are of the form:
(uc = 1) =⇒
∑
h∈Hc
(−Qhcxhc)pil(hc),t(hc) ≥ F˜c +
∑
h∈Hc
(−Qhcxhc)Vc, (23)
where for the given market prices pil,t, classical bid curves and the network are ’at equilibrium’,
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describing in particular the fact that ITM hourly bids are fully executed, OTM hourly bids are fully
rejected, and ATM hourly bids could be executed or rejected. In the condition, F˜c corresponds to
a start-up cost, and Vc to a variable cost of production, while
∑
h∈Hc
(−Qhcxhc)pil(hc),t(hc) denotes
the revenue generated at the given market prices.
We have shown in a previous article [11], in which other related economic aspects are considered,
how to give an exact linearization of this kind of constraints in the whole European market
model which can then be formulated as a MILP without any auxiliary variables, relying on strong
duality for linear programs to enforce equilibrium for the network, classical hourly bids, and hourly
bids related to accepted MIC bids. This is reviewed (and extended to include minimum power
output level conditions) below in Section 3.3. Let us also note here that an exact linearisation
similar to the one proposed in [11] has been independently proposed in [5]. Though the derivation
therein is technically different and e.g. needs to introduce many auxiliary continuous variables
and constraints for a McCormick convexification of bilinear binary-continuous terms, a parallel
could be made between ideas of the two approaches, which is beyond the scope of the present
contribution.
The following Table comparatively summarizes some core characteristics of the previous proposi-
tions to model minimum profit conditions and the present one presented below:
Proposition Start-up costs Variable costs Strict spatial
in the Welfare in the Min. Profit. Cond. price equilibrium
Garcia-Bertrand et al. [8] No marginal costs No
Garcia-Bertrand et al. [7] No marginal costs No
Gabriel et al. [6] Yes marginal costs No
Ruiz et al. [18] Yes marginal costs No
OMIE-PCR [3] No Ad-hoc var. costs Yes
Present contribution Yes marginal costs Yes
Table 3: Comparison of propositions
3.2 A new proposition for modelling MP conditions
We use a slightly modified version of a MIP framework introduced in [11], to enforce equilibrium
for the convex bids and the network, and which is computationally efficient in particular because
it avoids explicitly adding complementarity conditions modelling equilibrium for this convex part,
and also any auxiliary variables. It is used to present two distinct models for minimum profit
conditions in this setting: one used in practice for many years by OMIE now coupled to PCR,
and the new one involving the ’MP bids’ introduced in the present contribution.
3.2.1 Duality, uniform prices and deviations from equilibrium
Let us consider the primal welfare maximization problem UWELFARE stated in Section 2.2. Let
us now consider a partition C = Cr ∪Ca, and the following constraints, fixing all integer variables
11
to some arbitrarily given values (unit-commitment-like decisions):
− uca ≤ −1 ∀ca ∈ Ca ⊆ C [duaca ] (24)
ucr ≤ 0 ∀cr ∈ Cr ⊆ C [durcr ] (25)
Dropping integer constraints (9) not needed any more, this yields an LP whose dual is:
min
∑
i
si +
∑
c
sc +
∑
m
wmvm −
∑
ca∈Ca
duaca (26)
subject to:
si +Qipil(i),t(i) ≥ QiP i, ∀i [xi] (27)
(smaxhc − sminhc ) +Qhcpil(hc),t(hc) = QhcPhc, ∀h ∈ Hc, c [xhc] (28)
scr + du
r
cr ≥
∑
h∈Hc
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc )− Fc, ∀cr ∈ Cr [ucr ] (29)
sca − duaca ≥
∑
h∈Hc
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc )− Fc, ∀ca ∈ Ca [uca ] (30)∑
m
am,kvm −
∑
l,t
ekl,tpil,t = 0 ∀k ∈ K [nk] (31)
si, sc, shc, du
r
cr , du
a
ca , vm ≥ 0 (32)
We now write down the complementarity constraints corresponding to these primal and dual pro-
grams parametrized by the integer decisions. Economic interpretations are stated afterwards:
si(1− xi) = 0 ∀i ∈ I (33)
smaxhc (uc − xhc) = 0 ∀c, h ∈ Hc (34)
sminhc (xhc − rhcuc) = 0 ∀c, h ∈ Hc (35)
sc(1− uc) = 0 ∀c ∈ C (36)
vm(
∑
k
am,knk − wm) = 0 ∀m ∈ N (37)
(1− uca)duaca = 0 ∀c1 ∈ C1 (38)
ucrdu
r
cr = 0 ∀cr ∈ Cr (39)
xi(si +Qipil(i),t(i) −QiP i) = 0 ∀i ∈ I (40)
ucr (scr + du
r
cr −
∑
h∈Hcr
(smaxhcr − rhcrsminhcr ) + Fcr ) = 0 ∀cr ∈ Cr (41)
uca(sca − duaca −
∑
h∈Hca
(smaxhca − rhcasminhca ) + Fca) = 0 ∀ca ∈ Ca (42)
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In what follows, we consider uniform prices, that is all payments depend only and proportionally
on a single price pil,t for each location l and time period t.
In the following Lemmas, it is important to keep in mind the sign convention adopted, according
to which a bid quantity Q > 0 for a buy bid, and Q < 0 for a sell bid, cf. the description of
notation above.
Lemma 1 (Interpretation of si and equilibrium for hourly bids). Let us consider a solution to
(2)-(9), (24)-(25), (27)-(42). Variables si correspond to surplus variables, i.e.:
si = (QiP
i −Qipil(i),t(i))xi (43)
Moreover, the following equilibrium conditions hold, meaning that for the given market prices pil,t,
no other level of execution x∗i could be preferred to xi:
• An hourly bid i which is fully executed, i.e. for which xi = 1, is ITM or ATM, and the
surplus is given by si = (QiP
i −Qipil(i),t(i))xi = QiP i −Qipil(i),t(i) ≥ 0,
• An hourly bid i which is fractionally executed is ATM, i.e. (QiP i −Qipil(i),t(i)) = 0 = si
• Fully rejected bids i, i.e. for which xi = 0, are OTM or ATM, and then si = 0, which also
corresponds to the surplus: si = 0 = (QiP
i −Qipil(i),t(i))xi = (QiP i −Qipil(i),t(i))+,
Hence, ITM hourly bids are fully accepted, OTM hourly bids are fully rejected, and ATM
hourly bids i can be either accepted or rejected, fully or fractionally.
Proof. If xi = 1, conditions (40) ensure that si = QiP
i − Qipil(i),t(i) ≥ 0 (since si ≥ 0), and the
bid is ITM or ATM. Multiplying the obtained equality by xi = 1, we get identity (43).
If 0 < xi < 1, si = 0 = sixi according to (33), and (40) then gives si = QiP
i − Qipil(i),t(i) = 0:
the bid is ATM. Multiplying these equalities by xi, we get identity (43).
If xi = 0, si = 0 according to (33), which used in dual conditions (27) gives QiP
i−Qipil(i),t(i) ≤ 0:
the bid is OTM or ATM. As si = xi = 0, identity (43) is trivially satisfied.
Lemma 2 (Interpretation of smaxhc , s
min
hc ). Provided that uc = 1:
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc ) = (QhcPhc −Qhcpil(hc),t(hc))xhc (44)
while if uc = 0, then the left-hand side is disconnected from the right-hand side which is 0. Eco-
nomically speaking, this means that for rejected MP bids, the left-hand side only corresponds to a
potential surplus.
Proof. Multiplying (28) by xhc yields s
max
hc xhc − sminhc xhc = (QhcPhc −Qhcpil(hc),t(hc))xhc. Using
complementarity conditions (34)-(35) where uc = 1, according to which s
max
hc xhc = s
max
hc and
sminhc xhc = s
min
hc rhc, we get the required identity (44).
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For rejected MP bids, the sole deviation from an equilibrium affecting the corresponding hourly
bids is that some of them could be rejected paradoxically, since at equilibrium, they should or
could be rejected if they are out-of-the-money or at-the-money. The situation for accepted MP
bids is more interesting. Essentially, the situation is very similar to the case of classical hourly
bids described by Lemma 1, excepted that here, some ’MP hourly bids’ could be incurring a loss
due to the minimum acceptance ratio, and several configurations should be distinguished:
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium and deviations for MP hourly bids of accepted MP bids). Let us consider
hourly bids associated to an accepted MP bid c, i.e. such that uc = 1. If:
• 0 ≤ rhc < xhc < uc = 1, then smaxhc = sminhc = 0 , and the bid hc is at-the-money:
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc ) = 0 = (QhcPhc −Qhcpil(hc),t(hc)) = (QhcPhc −Qhcpil(hc),t(hc))xhc
• 0 ≤ rhc = xhc < uc = 1, then smaxhc = 0 and (smaxhc − rhcsminhc ) = (−rhcsminhc ) = (QhcPhc −
Qhcpil(hc),t(hc))xhc ≤ 0. Noting that sminhc ≥ 0 and xhc ≥ rhc ≥ 0, the bid is ATM or OTM,
and for rhc > 0, a loss could be incurred in that case.
• 0 ≤ rhc < xhc = uc = 1, then sminhc = 0 and (smaxhc − rhcsminhc ) = smaxhc = (QhcPhc −
Qhcpil(hc),t(hc))xhc ≥ 0: the bid is ITM or ATM.
• In the special case where rhc = 1 = xhc = uc, nothing could be inferred on smaxhc , sminhc , and
the bid could be ITM, ATM or OTM, depending on the sign of (smaxhc − rhcsminhc ).
Proof. This follows a direct discussion of the equality (44) of Lemma 2, using complementarity
conditions (34)-(35), with uc = 1.
The following Lemma is key to derive Theorem 1 and then Corollary 1. These are the main
ingredients to derive a MILP formulation avoiding any auxiliary variables of the new model for
minimum profit conditions.
Lemma 4 (Interpretation of dua, dur). (i) ∀ca ∈ Ca, duaca , is an upper bound on the loss of
order ca, given by
[
∑
h∈Hca
(smaxhca − rhcasminhca )−Fca ]− = [
∑
h∈Hca
(QhcaP
hca −Qhcapil(hca),t(hca))xhca −Fca ]−, where
[a]− denotes the negative part of a, i.e. −min[0, a].
(ii) durcr is an upper bound on the sum of the maximum missed individual hourly surpluses (some
of which could be negative) minus the fixed cost Fcr of the rejected MP bid cr, that is:
durcr ≥
∑
h∈Hcr
(smaxhcr − rhcrsminhcr )− Fcr ≥
∑
h∈Hcr
(QhcrP
hcr −Qhcrpil(hcr),t(hcr))− Fcr .
Proof. (i) Since uca = 1, and using conditions (42), we have:
sca − duaca =
∑
h∈Hca
(smaxhca − rhcasminhca )− Fca . Since, sca , duaca ≥ 0, the observation follows (cf. also
Lemma 2 for the identity used to replace (smaxhca − rhcasminhca )).
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(ii) Conditions of type (36) show that scr = 0, which used in (29) provide the first inequality. Then,
as rhcr ∈ [0, 1] and sminhcr ≥ 0 , one has (smaxhcr −rhcrsminhcr ) ≥ (smaxhcr −sminhcr ) = QhcPhc−Qhcpil(hc),t(hc)
where this last equality is given by (28). The result immediately follows.
Theorem 1 (MP conditions and shadow costs of acceptance dua). Let us consider a given partition
Ca ∪ Cr and a solution to (2)-(9), (24)-(25), (27)-(42):
• For an accepted sell bid ca ∈ Ca, i.e. for which ∀hca ∈ Hca , Qhca < 0:
(−
∑
h∈Hca
Qhcpil(hc),t(hc)xhc) ≥ (−
∑
h∈Hca
QhcP
hcxhc) + Fca ⇐⇒ duaca = 0,
where the left-hand side of the equivalence expresses that the revenue from trade is greater or
equal to the sum of marginal costs plus the fixed cost Fc, which is a minimum profit condition.
• For an accepted buy bid ca ∈ Ca, i.e. for which ∀hca ∈ Hca , Qhca > 0:
(
∑
h∈Hca
Qhcpil(hc),t(hc)xhc) ≤ (
∑
h∈Hca
QhcP
hcxhc)− Fca ⇐⇒ duaca = 0,
where the left-hand side of the equivalence expresses that the total payments are lesser or
equal to the total utility reduced by the constant term Fc, which is a maximum payment
condition.
Proof. It is a direct consequence of Lemma 4. If duaca = 0, then∑
h∈Hca
(QhcaP
hca − Qhcapil(hca),t(hca))xhca − Fca ≥ 0, which rearranged provides the result (the
converse holding as well: if this last inequality holds, the duaca can be set to 0 without altering the
satisfaction of the other constraints).
Corollary 1. MP conditions could be expressed by requiring that shadow costs of acceptance could
be set to zero, i.e.:
∀ca ∈ Ca, duaca = 0 (45)
Naturally, not all MP bid selections Ca, Cr are such that these conditions hold for all accepted MP
bids ca ∈ Ca, cf. e.g. the toy example presented in Section 2.1. Moreover, admissible selections
Ca, Cr for which all shadow costs of acceptance could be set to zero are not known in advance.
However, following [11], we can provide a MILP formulation without any auxiliary variables,
exactly describing those admissible partitions Ca, Cr, together with a corresponding solution to
(2)-(9), (24)-(25), (27)-(42). This is developed in the next subsection.
3.2.2 A MILP without auxiliary variables modelling MP conditions
To state Theorem 2 about the formulation UMFS, we need to include the following technical
constraint limiting the market price range
pil,t ∈ [−p¯i, p¯i] ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T. (46)
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p¯i can be chosen large enough to avoid excluding any relevant market clearing solution (see [10]).
Note that in practice, power exchanges actually do impose that the computed prices pil,t stay
within a given range in order to limit market power and price volatility, see e.g. [3].
Uniform Market Clearing Feasible Set (UMFS):
∑
i
(P iQi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)xhc −
∑
c
Fcuc
≥
∑
i
si +
∑
c
sc −
∑
c∈C
duac +
∑
m
wmvm (47)
xi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I[si] (48)
xhc ≤ uc ∀h ∈ Hc, c ∈ C [smaxhc ] (49)
xhc ≥ rhcuc ∀h ∈ Hc, c ∈ C [sminhc ] (50)
uc ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ C[sc] (51)∑
i∈Ilt
Qixi +
∑
hc∈HClt
Qhcxhc
=
∑
k
ekl,tnk, ∀(l, t) [pil,t] (52)∑
k
am,knk ≤ wm ∀m ∈ N [vm] (53)
x, u ≥ 0, (54)
u ∈ Z (55)
si +Qipil(i),t(i) ≥ QiP i, ∀i [xi] (56)
(smaxhc − sminhc ) +Qhcpil(hc),t(hc) = QhcPhc, ∀h ∈ Hc, c [xhc] (57)
sc + du
r
c − duac ≥
∑
h∈Hc
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc )− Fc, ∀c ∈ C [uc] (58)
durc ≤Mc(1− uc) ∀c ∈ C (59)
duac ≤Mcuc ∀c ∈ C (60)∑
m
am,kvm −
∑
l,t
ekl,tpil,t = 0 ∀k ∈ K[nk] (61)
si, sc, s
max
hc , s
min
hc , du
a, dur, vm ≥ 0 (62)
Theorem 2. (I) Let (x, u, n, pi, v, s, dua, dur) be any feasible point of UMFS satisfying the price
range condition (46), and let us define Cr = {c|uc = 0}, Ca = {c|uc = 1}.
Then the projection (x, u, n, pi, v, s, duaca∈Ca , du
r
cr∈Cr ) satisfies all conditions in (2)-(9), (24)-(42).
(II) Conversely, any point
MCS = (x, u, n, pi, v, s, duaca∈Ca , du
r
cr∈Cr ) feasible for constraints (2)-(9), (24)-(42) related to a
given arbitrary MIC selection C = Cr ∪ Ca which respects the price range condition (46) can be
‘lifted’ to obtain a feasible point ˜MCS = (x, u, n, pi, v, s˜, ˜dua, ˜dur) of UMFS.
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Sketch of the proof. This is a straightforward adaptation of Theorem 1 in [11]. Essentially: (I)
any feasible point of UMFS defines a corresponding partition Ca ∪ Cr of accepted and rejected
MP bids, and conditions (58)-(60) ensure that (29)-(30) are satisfied whatever the corresponding
partition is. It is then direct to check that conditions in (2)-(9), (24)-(42) are all satisfied, since,
provided (27)-(32), (47) can then equivalently be replaced by the complementarity conditions (33)-
(42) as optimality conditions for the program (1) subject to (2)-(9), (24)-(25). (Let us note that
as dua, dur are upper bounds on losses or missed surpluses, see Lemma 4, the involved big-Ms
in (59)-(60) are appropriately defined using the technical condition (46) bounding the range of
possible market prices.)
(II) Conversely, for any partition Ca∪Cr and a solution to (2)-(9), (24)-(42) such that the condition
(46) is satisfied, we only need to define the additional values duac = 0 for c ∈ Cr and durc = 0
for c ∈ Ca. Since the big-Ms have been suitably defined using (46), and using (29)-(30), it is
straightforward to check that (58)-(60) will be satisfied for all c ∈ C, and hence all conditions
(47)-(62) defining UMFS are satisfied (again relying on the equivalence of (33)-(42) and (47) as
optimality conditions for (1) subject to (2)-(9), (24)-(25) provided that (2)-(9),(24)-(25) and the
dual conditions (27)-(32) are satisfied).
As we want to enforce MP conditions, we need to add to UMFS the following conditions:
∀c ∈ C, duac = 0 (63)
Since we set all the duac to 0, constraints (60) are not needed any more, and constraints (58)-
(59) reduce to (76) below. We hence get the following MILP formulation which we denote
’MarketClearing-MPC’, enforcing all MP conditions, and which doesn’t make use of any auxiliary
variable.
MarketClearing-MPC
max
∑
i
(P iQi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)xhc −
∑
c
Fcuc (64)
subject to:
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∑
i
(P iQi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)xhc −
∑
c
Fcuc
≥
∑
i
si +
∑
c
sc +
∑
m
wmvm [σ] (65)
xi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I [si] (66)
xhc ≤ uc ∀h ∈ Hc, c ∈ C [smaxhc ] (67)
xhc ≥ rhcuc ∀h ∈ Hc, c ∈ C [sminhc ] (68)
uc ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ C[sc] (69)∑
i∈Ilt
Qixi +
∑
hc∈HClt
Qhcxhc
=
∑
k
ekl,tnk, ∀(l, t) [pil,t] (70)∑
k
am,knk ≤ wm ∀m ∈ N [vm] (71)
x, u ≥ 0, (72)
u ∈ Z (73)
si +Qipil(i),t(i) ≥ QiP i, ∀i [xi] (74)
(smaxhc − sminhc ) +Qhcpil(hc),t(hc) = QhcPhc, ∀h ∈ Hc, c [xhc] (75)
sc ≥
∑
h∈Hc
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc )− Fc −Mc(1− uc) ∀c ∈ C[uc] (76)∑
m
am,kvm −
∑
l,t
ekl,tpil,t = 0 ∀k ∈ K[nk] (77)
si, sc, shc, vm ≥ 0 (78)
3.3 Comparison to ’Minimum income conditions’ used by OMIE / PCR
The way minimum profit conditions are handled in OMIE-PCR, described in Section 3.1, presents
two substantial differences compared to the MP bids introduced above. First, start-up costs are
not included in the welfare maximizing objective function, and second there is the presence of a
variable cost Vc which could have no relation to the marginal cost curves described by the hourly
bids hc, c ∈ Hc. In [11], we have shown how such ’minimum income conditions’ could be linearized
exactly without any auxiliary variables, in the frame of the PCR market rules. We adapt here this
result to take into account minimum acceptance ratios (corresponding e.g. to minimum output
levels) modelled by conditions (4), which were not considered in [11]. This helps considering more
formally the differences between MP bids and classical bids with a minimum income condition
currently in use in OMIE-PCR.
Let us denote by F˜c the actual start-up cost attached to some bid c provided by a producer. As
in OMIE-PCR, start-up costs F˜c are not considered in the welfare objective function, it is first
needed to set all parameters Fc = 0 in MarketClearing-MPC, but then, nothing ensures that
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these start-up costs are recovered for executed bids. It is therefore needed to explicitly include a
condition equivalent to (23), and this can be done in a linear way without any auxiliary variables
and any approximation, using the following Lemma:
Lemma 5 (Adaptation of Lemma 3 in [11]). Consider any feasible point of MarketClearing-MPC
in the case where all parameters Fc are set to 0. Then, the following holds:
∀c ∈ C,
∑
h∈Hc
(−Qhcxhc)pil(hc),t(hc) = sc −
∑
h∈Hc
(QhcP
hc)xhc (79)
Proof. The identity is trivially satisfied if uc = 0, thanks to conditions (3) and (36) which are
enforced for any feasible point of MarketClearing-MPC.
For uc = 1, summing up (44) in Lemma 2 over hc ∈ Hc, we get:
∑
hc∈Hc
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc ) =
∑
hc∈Hc
(QhcP
hc −Qhcpil(hc),t(hc))xhc (80)
Then, noting that MarketClearing-MPC enforces (42) with dua = 0, and that we have set all
Fc = 0 not to consider start-up costs in the welfare objective, we can replace the left-hand side of
(80) by sc to get the required identity.
Let us note that the economic interpretation of the algebraic identity provided by (79) is straight-
forward: the total income in the left-hand side can be decomposed as the total marginal costs plus
the total surplus sc collecting individual surpluses of all the individual bid curves associated to
the MIC order.
Using Lemma 5, the MIC condition (23) can then be stated in a linear way as follows:
sc −
∑
h∈Hc
(QhcP
hc)xhc ≥ F˜c +
∑
h∈Hc
(−Qhcxhc)Vc −Mc(1− uc) (81)
where Mc is a fixed number large enough to deactivate the constraint when uc = 0. As uc = 0
implies sc = 0 and xhc = 0, we set Mc := F˜c.
Let us emphasise that once this is done and that we have a linear description of the feasible
set handling minimum income conditions as done in OMIE-PCR, many objective functions could
be considered, including objective functions involving startup and variable costs in the measure
of welfare instead of the marginal costs described by the bid curves associated to a given MIC
order.
From a modelling point of view there are therefore two main differences between the MP bids
proposed here and the OMIE-PCR MIC orders. The first one is that we need to explicitly state
constraints (81), apart from the single constraint (65) that essentially enforce all complementary
conditions simultaneously. This is because in the OMIE-PCR model, the fixed and variable costs of
the MIC orders are not part of the objective function to be maximised. This is linked to the second
difference that in the OMIE-PCR model, there are two different variable costs for MIC orders:
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one that appears in the objective function to be maximised Phc, and another one Vc that appears
in the MIC condition (81). It is questionable whether these two costs actually correspond to real
costs of a power plant. This makes the task of regulators in charge of monitoring market behaviour
of participants more difficult. Indeed it is not clear any more what is the normal or justifiable
market behaviour, and what constitutes gaming or a possible exercise of market power.
4 Handling ramping constraints
Ramping constraints are also called ’load-gradient’ conditions in the PCR vocabulary, see [3]. Let
us suppose one wants to include in the primal program UWELFARE (1)-(9) ramping constraints
for each MP bid representing the technical conditions for operating the corresponding power plant.
Our goal is to show how to adapt all results of the present contribution regarding minimum profit
(resp. maximum payment) conditions in this setting. Ramping constraints to add are of the
form:
∑
hc∈Hc|t(hc)=t+1
(−Qhc)xhc −
∑
hc∈Hc|t(hc)=t
(−Qhc)xhc ≤ RUc uc ∀t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1},∀c ∈ C [gupc,t]
(82)∑
hc∈Hc|t(hc)=t
(−Qhc)xhc −
∑
hc∈Hc|t(hc)=t+1
(−Qhc)xhc ≤ RDc uc ∀t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1},∀c ∈ C [gdownc,t ]
(83)
The occurrences of uc might seem unnecessary and optional as the conditions would be trivially
satisfied for uc = 0. However, these occurrences are technically required to derive the appropriate
dual program and adapt straightforwardly all previous results. They also make the continuous re-
laxation of the resulting Integer Program stronger. The corresponding complementarity conditions
that will be enforced as all other complementarity conditions in Theorem 2 are:
gupc,t(RUc uc −
∑
hc∈Hc|t(hc)=t
Qhcxhc +
∑
hc∈Hc|t(hc)=t+1
Qhcxhc) = 0 ∀t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1},∀c ∈ C
(84)
gdownc,t (RDc uc −
∑
hc∈Hc|t(hc)=t+1
Qhcxhc +
∑
hc∈Hc|t(hc)=t
Qhcxhc) = 0 ∀t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1},∀c ∈ C
(85)
Such constraints do not exist for t = 0 or t = T , but the following convention is useful for writing
what follows while avoiding distinguishing different cases: gupc,0 = g
down
c,0 = g
up
c,T = g
down
c,T = 0.
The dual constraints(28), (29) and (30) should then respectively be replaced by:
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(smaxhc − sminhc ) + (Qhcgdownc,t(hc)−1 −Qhcgupc,t(hc)−1) + (Qhcgupc,t(hc) −Qhcgdownc,t(hc)) +Qhcpil(hc),t(hc)
= QhcP
hc, ∀h ∈ Hc,∀c ∈ C [xhc] (86)
scr +du
r
cr ≥
∑
h∈Hcr
(smaxhc −rhcsminhc )+
∑
t
(RUcrg
up
cr,t(hc)
+RDcrg
down
cr,t(hc)
)−Fcr , ∀cr ∈ Cr [ucr ]
(87)
sca−duaca ≥
∑
h∈Hca
(smaxhc −rhcsminhc )+
∑
t
(RUcag
up
ca,t(hc)
+RDcag
down
ca,t(hc)
)−Fca , ∀ca ∈ Ca [uca ]
(88)
with the corresponding consequence in the formulation of UMFS (used in Theorem 2) of replacing
(58) by
sc + du
r
c − duac ≥
∑
h∈Hc
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc ) +
∑
t
(RUcg
up
c,t(hc) +RDcg
down
c,t(hc))− Fc, ∀c ∈ C [uc]
(89)
It is shown below that this is all we need to handle ramping constraints. Adaptation of Lemma
4 and Theorem 1 are then straightforward, as it suffices to replace in the proofs the occurrences
of
∑
h∈Hc
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc ) by its analogue provided by the left-hand side of (92) below, and the
corresponding adaptations needed e.g. in MarketClearing-MPC immediately follows.
These assertions rest on the follwing adaptation of Lemma 2:
Lemma 6 (Adaptation of Lemma 2 to handle ramping constraints). Provided that uc = 1, :
1.
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc ) + (Qhcgdownc,t(hc)−1 −Qhcgupc,t(hc)−1)xhc + (Qhcgupc,t(hc) −Qhcgdownc,t(hc))xhc
= (QhcP
hc −Qhcpil(hc),t(hc))xhc (90)
2.∑
hc∈Hc
(Qhcgdownc,t(hc)−1 −Qhcgupc,t(hc)−1)xhc +
∑
hc∈Hc
(Qhcgupc,t(hc) −Qhcgdownc,t(hc))xhc
=
∑
t
(RUcg
up
c,t(hc) +RDcg
down
c,t(hc)) (91)
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3.∑
h∈Hc
(smaxhc − rhcsminhc ) +
∑
t
(RUcg
up
c,t(hc) +RDcg
down
c,t(hc)) =
∑
h∈Hc
[QhcP
hc −Qhcpil(hc),t(hc)]xhc
(92)
Proof. 1. is obtained by multiplying equation (86) by the corresponding dual variable xhc and
by using as in Lemma 2 the complementarity conditions (34)-(35) with uc = 1, according to
which smaxhc xhc = s
max
hc and s
min
hc xhc = s
min
hc rhc.
2. Summing equations (84) and (85) then summing up over t and rearranging the terms provides
the result, noting that it is assumed that uc = 1.
3. is a direct consequence of 1. and 2., obtained by summing up (90) over hc ∈ Hc and using
the identity provided by (91)
5 A decomposition procedure with Strengthened Benders
cuts
The contribution in this Section is essentially to show how the Benders decomposition procedure
with strengthened cuts described in [10] for fully indivisible block bids apply to the present con-
text of newly introduced bids with a minimum profit/maximum payment condition (MP bids),
providing an efficient method for large-scale instances where both block and MP bids are present,
as such decomposition approaches (see also [13, 3]) are known to be efficient to handle block bids.
The present extension includes as a special case instances involving block bids with a minimum
acceptance ratio as described in [3].
This Benders decomposition procedure solves MarketClearing-MPC , working with (an implicit
decription of) the projection G of the MarketClearing-MPC feasible set described by (65)-(78) on
the space of primal decision variables (xi, xhc, uc, nk). In particular, we start with a relaxation of
G, denoted G0 and described by constraints (66)-(73), and then add Benders cuts to G0 which are
valid inequalities for G derived from a so-called worker program until a feasible - hence optimal -
solution is found. The worker program generates cuts to cut off incumbents for which no prices
exist such that all MP conditions could be enforced, see Theorems 3 and 4. It is shown that these
Benders cuts correspond indeed to ’no-good cuts’ rejecting the current MP bids combination,
see Theorem 5. We show how these cuts could be strengthened, providing stronger and sparser
cuts which are valid for G when they are computed to cut off solutions which are optimal for
the master program (potentially with cuts added at previous iterations where applicable), cf.
Theorem 6. Instead of adding these cuts iteratively after solving the augmented master program
each time up to optimality, it could be preferable to generate them within a branch-and-cut
algorithm solving this master program (hence also MarketClearing-MPC, as MP conditions will
be checked and enforced when needed). In that case, the strengthened cuts are locally valid,
i.e. in branch-and-bound subtrees originating from incumbents rejected by the worker program
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during the branch-and-cut algorithm solving the master program, see Theorem 7. Adding cuts
after solving master programs up to optimality is similar to the original approach described in
the seminal paper [1], while adding cuts inside a branch-and-cut, which is often more efficient, is
sometimes called the ’modern version’ of a Benders decomposition. Let us note that the classical
Benders cuts of Theorem 4 or their ’no-good’ equivalent of Theorem 5 are always globally valid,
as opposed to their strengthened version of Theorem 7.
Let us also mention a very interesting result. The revised version of [16] appearing as Chapter 2
in [15] and relying on [10] proposes an analogue of Theorem 7 in a context which considers general
”mixed integer bids”, a careful analysis of which shows they encompass the MP bids proposed
here (though there is no mention of applications such as the modeling of start up costs and the
minimum profit conditions or ramping constraints, etc). As noted therein, the author generalizes
the applicability of the cuts of Theorem 6 in [10], similar to those of Theorem 7 below, to these
general mixed integer bids (and general convex bids besides) using a completely different technique
than the present Benders decomposition which relies on other considerations and the primal-dual
formulations presented above (shadow costs of acceptance in Theorem 1, etc).
Let us consider a master branch-and-bound solving (64) subject to the initial constraints (66)-(73),
and let (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k) be an incumbent satisfying (66)-(73) of MarketClearing-MPC.
A direct application of the Farkas Lemma to the remaining linear conditions (65), (74)-(78), which
is detailed in appendix, yields:
Theorem 3 (Worker program of the decomposition). Let (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k) be an incumbent satis-
fying (66)-(73), then there exists (pi, s, v) such that all MP conditions modelled by (65), (74)-(78)
are satisfied if and only if:
max
(x,u,n)∈P
∑
i
(P iQi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)xhc −
∑
c
Fcuc −Mc(1− u∗c)uc
≤ (
∑
i
(P iQi)x
∗
i +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)x
∗
hc −
∑
c
Fcu
∗
c), (93)
where P is the polyhedron defined by the linear conditions (66)-(72), that is the linear relaxation
of (66)-(73). This condition is also equivalent to
max
(x,u,n)∈P |uc=0 if u∗c=0
∑
i
(P iQi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)xhc −
∑
c
Fcuc
≤ (
∑
i
(P iQi)x
∗
i +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)x
∗
hc −
∑
c
Fcu
∗
c), (94)
where no bigMs are involved.
Proof. See appendix.
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A direct consequence of Theorem 3 is:
Theorem 4 (Classical Benders cuts). Suppose (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k) doesn’t belong to G, i.e. there are
no prices such that MP conditions could all be satisfied, i.e. for which the test of Theorem 3 fails.
Then, the following Benders cut is a valid inequality for G and cuts off the current incumbent
(x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k):
∑
i
(P iQi)x
#
i +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)x
#
hc −
∑
c
Fcu
#
c −Mc(1− uc)u#c
≤ (
∑
i
(P iQi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)xhc −
∑
c
Fcuc), (95)
where (x#i , x
#
hc, u
#
c , n
#
k ) is an optimal solution to the left-hand side worker program in (93) (resp.
(94)).
Lemma 7. In the feasible set of MarketClearing-MPC, welfare is univocally determined by an MP
bids combination, i.e., by given arbitrarily values for the variables uc.
Proof. Let us consider a feasible point of MarketClearing-MPC and the corresponding MP bids
combination Ca∪Cr. As detailed in Theorem 2 and its proof, this point is then feasible for (2)-(9),
(24)-(25), (27)-(32) and (33)-(42), which are optimality conditions for the welfare maximization
program (1)-(9), (24)-(25) where only the integer values of the variables uc have been fixed.
Observation 1. An optimal solution of the left-hand side of (93) is always such that u#c = 0
if u∗c = 0, because of the penalty coefficients Mc, or alternatively because u
#
c corresponds to the
optimal dual variable of (76) which is not tight when u∗c = 0.
Theorem 5 (No-good / Combinatorial Benders cuts). Suppose (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k) doesn’t belong to
G, i.e. there are no prices such that MP conditions could all be satisfied, i.e. for which the test of
Theorem 3 fails.
Then, the following ’no-good cut’ is a valid inequality for G and cuts off the current incumbent:
∑
c|u∗c=1
(1− uc) +
∑
c|u∗c=0
uc ≥ 1, (96)
basically excluding the current MP bids combination.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Theorem 4. Suppose we need to cut off (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k) by
adding (95). For any other solution (xi, xhc, uc, nk) such that uc = u
∗
c for all c ∈ C, the left-hand
side value of (95) will trivially be the same as with u∗. The right-hand side will also be the same
as with u∗ according to Lemma 7, because welfare is univocally determined by the values of the
uc. Hence any such solution will also violate (95) and it is therefore needed to change the value
of at least one of the uc, providing the result.
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Theorem 6 (Globally valid strengthened Benders cuts). Let (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k) be an optimal solu-
tion for the master program (64) subject to (66)-(73), potentially with additional valid inequalities.
If the test of Theorem 3 fails, the following sparse cut is a valid inequality for G:
∑
c|u∗c=1
(1− uc) ≥ 1, (97)
meaning that at least one of the currently accepted MP bids should be excluded in any valid market
clearing solution satisfying MP conditions.
Proof. This is also a consequence of Theorem 4. First, observe that (97) trivially implies (96) and
hence cuts off (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k), according to Theorem 5. It remains to show that it is also a valid
inequality for G.
Let (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k) be the optimal solution considered that violates (95), i.e., such that:
∑
i
(P iQi)x
#
i +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)x
#
hc −
∑
c
Fcu
#
c −Mc(1− u∗c)u#c
> (
∑
i
(P iQi)x
∗
i +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)x
∗
hc −
∑
c
Fcu
∗
c), (98)
which using Observation 1 reduces to:
(
∑
i
(P iQi)x
∗
i +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)x
∗
hc −
∑
c
Fcu
∗
c)
<
∑
i
(P iQi)x
#
i +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)x
#
hc −
∑
c
Fcu
#
c (99)
Suppose (xi, xhc, uc, nk) is feasible for (66)-(73) (with the potential added valid inequalities ob-
tained at previous iterations). Because of the optimality of (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k),
(
∑
i
(P iQi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)xhc −
∑
c
Fcuc)
≤ (
∑
i
(P iQi)x
∗
i +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)x
∗
hc −
∑
c
Fcu
∗
c)
<
∑
i
(P iQi)x
#
i +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)x
#
hc −
∑
c
Fcu
#
c (100)
Now suppose (xi, xhc, uc, nk) does not satisfy (97), i.e., that
∑
c|u∗c=1
(1− uc) = 0. Then, also using
Observation 1 exactly as to reduce (98) to (99), the valid cut (95) that this other solution must
satisfy to potentially be in G reduces to:
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∑
i
(P iQi)x
#
i +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)x
#
hc −
∑
c
Fcu
#
c
≤ (
∑
i
(P iQi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)xhc −
∑
c
Fcuc), (101)
which contradicts (100). Hence, (97) must hold for any other (xi, xhc, uc, nk) that is in G.
Now, suppose we want to use the sparse cuts of Theorem 6 within the branch-and-bound tree
solving the master program, instead of adding them after solving up-to-optimality the master
program (together with the cuts obtained at previous iterations where applicable). Then these
cuts are valid locally, i.e. in the subtrees originating from the incumbents to cut off, as their
validity depends on the local optimality of this incumbent to cut off:
Theorem 7 (Locally valid strengthened Benders cuts). Let again (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k) be an incumbent
obtained via an LP relaxation at a given node of the branch-and-cut solving the master program
(64) subject to (66)-(73). If the test of Theorem 3 fails, the following sparse cut is locally valid,
i.e. is valid in the subtree of the branch-and-bound originating from the current node providing the
incumbent (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k):
∑
c|u∗c=1
(1− uc) ≥ 1, (102)
meaning that at least one of the currently accepted MP bids should be excluded in any solution
found deeper in the subtree.
Proof. This is also a consequence of Theorem 4 and the proof is a slight variant of the proof of
Theorem 6. Since in the present case (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k) is just an incumbent and no longer globally
optimal for the master program, to reproduce the argument providing (100), we use the local
optimality of the incumbent (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k) obtained via an LP relaxation, and the fact that
the other solutions considered (xi, xhc, uc, nk) lie in the subtree originating from the current node
providing (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k).
6 Numerical Experiments
Implementation of the models and algorithms proposed above have been made in Julia using
JuMP[9], an open source package providing an algebraic modelling language embedded within
Julia, CPLEX 12.6.2 as the underlying MIP solver, and ran on a laptop with an i5 5300U CPU
with 4 cores @2.3 Ghz and 8GB of RAM. The source code and sample data sets used to compute the
tables presented below are available online, see [12] . Let us note that thanks to Julia/JuMP, it is
easy to switch from one solver to another, provided that all the required features are available. Raw
implementations of the primal-dual formulation MarketClearing-MPC, and the classic and modern
Benders decompositions all fit within 250 lines of code including input-output data management
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(see the file ’dam.jl’ provided online), while some solution checking tools provided in an auxiliary
file span about 180 lines of code.
Our main purpose here is to compare the new approach proposed to the market rules used until
now by the power exchange OMIE (part of PCR). We thus have considered realistic datasets
corresponding to the case of Spain and Portugal. Notable differences compared to real data for
example available at [17] is that the marginal costs of the first steps of each bid curve associated
to a given MIC order have been replaced by the variable cost of that MIC order whenever they
were below the variable cost, and as a consequence, a minimum acceptance ratio of 0.6 has been
set for the first step of each of these bid curves. The rationale for such modifications is the
following: marginal costs for the first steps of the bid curves are sometimes very low (even almost
null) certainly to ensure a reasonable level of acceptance of the corresponding offered quantities
for operational reasons, and increasing them would decrease too much the accepted quantities at
some hours, which is counterbalanced by setting an appropriate acceptance ratio at each hour
in case the MP order is part of the market outcome solution. Let us recall that an MP order
can only be accepted if the losses incurred at some hours (due to the minimum acceptance ratios
forcing paradoxical acceptances which are ’measured’ by the dual variables sminhc ) are sufficiently
compensated by the profits made at some other hours of the day. All the costs have then been
uniformly scaled to obtain interesting instances where e.g. the MP conditions are not all verified
if only the primal program (1)-(9) is solved. As network aspects are not central here, a simple two
nodes network corresponding to coupling Spain and Portugal is considered.
Inst. Welfare Abs. gap Solver’s cuts Nodes Runtime # MP Bids # Curve Steps
1 151218658.27 0.00 24 388 72.63 92 14494
2 115365156.34 0.00 15 181 38.08 90 14309
3 112999837.94 1644425.79 21 4085 600.17 91 14329
4 107060355.83 0.00 16 0 7.63 89 14370
5 100118316.52 0.00 15 347 96.06 89 15091
6 97572068.18 0.00 18 1116 143.65 86 14677
7 87937471.32 1091700.74 27 4958 600.11 87 14979
8 89866979.23 0.00 87 1707 296.41 87 16044
9 86060320.81 0.00 97 361 57.27 81 15177
10 90800596.61 3755055.95 59 2430 600.02 90 16475
Table 4: Instances with ’MIC Orders’ as in OMIE-PCR
As both market models, though different, pursue the same goal of modelling start-up costs and
marginal costs recovery conditions while representing in some ways indivisibilities of production
(with minimum acceptance ratios or using very low marginal costs for the first amounts of power
produced in some original datasets), Tables 4 & 5 propose a comparison from a computational point
of view, which shows the benefits of the new approach. A key issue wit the current practice is the
absence of the fixed costs in the objective function and the occurrence of an ’ad-hoc’ variable cost
in the minimum income conditions which is not related to the marginal costs used in the objective
function. The objective function in the continuous relaxations somehow ’goes in a direction’
which may not be the most appropriate with respect to the enforcement of the minimum income
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Inst. Welfare Abs. gap Solver’s cuts Nodes Runtime # MP Bids # Curve Steps
1 151487156.16 0.00 11 9 17.36 92 14494
2 115475592.36 0.00 11 0 16.38 90 14309
3 114220400.20 0.00 24 0 17.23 91 14329
4 107219935.90 0.00 35 7 17.48 89 14370
5 100743738.16 0.00 14 0 14.74 89 15091
6 98359291.45 0.00 10 0 15.67 86 14677
7 89251699.16 0.00 84 3 22.92 87 14979
8 90797407.15 0.00 27 0 21.58 87 16044
9 86403721.22 0.00 35 7 25.04 81 15177
10 94034444.59 0.00 20 0 19.58 90 16475
Table 5: Instances with MP bids - MarketClearing-MPC formulation
conditions. On the other side, the new approach seems more natural as it enforces minimum profit
conditions by requiring that the ’shadow costs of acceptance’ dua must all be null, see Corollary
1.
Table 6 is to be compared with Table 5 e.g. in terms of runtimes and visited nodes, as it solves
exactly the same market model. Heuristics of the solver have been here deactivated as primal
feasible solutions found need to be obtained as optimal solutions of the LP relaxation at the given
node for the local cuts of Theorem 7 to be valid (cf. its statement above). As it can be seen, the
Benders decomposition is faster by an order of magnitude for the instances at hand.
Inst. Welfare Lazy cuts Solver’s cuts Nodes Runtime # MP Bids # Curve Steps
1 151487156.16 2 0 5 2.66 92 14494
2 115475592.36 1 18 5 1.38 90 14309
3 114220400.20 1 28 3 1.81 91 14329
4 107219935.90 2 14 11 1.78 89 14370
5 100743738.16 1 12 3 1.36 89 15091
6 98359291.45 1 3 3 1.36 86 14677
7 89251699.16 1 29 8 1.54 87 14979
8 90797407.15 1 11 3 1.66 87 16044
9 86403721.22 2 1 13 2.24 81 15177
10 94034444.59 1 40 4 1.54 90 16475
Table 6: Instances with MP bids - Benders decomposition of Theorem 7
7 Conclusions
A new approach to minimum profit or maximum payment conditions has been proposed in the
form of a bidding product called ’MP bid’, which turns out to generalize both block orders with a
minimum acceptance ratio used in France, Germany or Belgium, and, mutatis mutandis, complex
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orders with a minimum income condition used in Spain and Portugal. The corresponding market
clearing conditions such as minimum profit or maximum payment conditions can be expressed with
a ’primal-dual’ MILP model involving both primal decision variables such as unit commitment or
power output variables, and dual decision variables such as market prices or economic surpluses of
market participants, while avoiding the introduction of any auxiliary variables, whether continuous
or binary. Moreover, it can be used to derive a Benders decomposition with strengthened cuts of a
kind which is known to be efficient to handle block bids. These MP bids hence seem an appropriate
tool to foster market design and bidding products convergence among the different regions which
form the coupled European day-ahead electricity markets of the Pan-European PCR project. Also,
compared to the MIC orders currently in use at OMIE-PCR, they have the following additional
advantages. Firstly, they lead to optimisation models that can be solved much more quickly.
Secondly, the proposed instruments seem to be more aligned with the operating constraints and
cost structure of the power plants that they are supposed to represent in the market. Finally, they
are more natural (from an economic point of view) and simpler (from a modelling point of view),
leading to a market model easier to understand for participants and monitor for regulators. All the
models and algorithms have been implemented in Julia/JuMP and are available online together
with sample datasets to foster research and exchange on the topic. The models and algorithms
can also be used to clear instances involving block bids only (small extensions could also be added
to handle linked and exclusive block orders as described in [3] if desired). European day-ahead
electricity markets will certainly be subject to a major evolution in the coming years, as many
challenges are still to be faced, which calls for further research within the academic and industrial
communities. The present contribution is a proposal made in that frame.
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A Omitted proofs in main text
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Reminder of the Farkas Lemma [20], which is used in the proof afterward:
∃x : Ax <= b, x ≥ 0 if and only if ∀y : y ≥ 0, yA ≥ 0⇒ yb ≥ 0
Proof. Applying the Farkas lemma, given an incumbent (x∗i , x
∗
hc, u
∗
c , n
∗
k), a solution (si, s
max
hc , s
min
hc , sc, pil,t, vm)
to the remaining linear conditions (65), (74)-(78) exist if and only if:
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∑
i
(P iQi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)xhc −
∑
c
Fcuc −Mc(1− u∗c)uc
≤ σ(
∑
i
(P iQi)x
∗
i +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)x
∗
hc −
∑
c
Fcu
∗
c) (103)
∀(σ, xi, xhc, uc, nk) such that:
xi ≤ σ ∀i ∈ I [si] (104)
xhc ≤ uc ∀h ∈ Hc, c ∈ C [smaxhc ] (105)
xhc ≥ rhcuc ∀h ∈ Hc, c ∈ C [sminhc ] (106)
uc ≤ σ ∀c ∈ C[sc] (107)∑
i∈Ilt
Qixi +
∑
hc∈HClt
Qhcxhc
=
∑
k
ekl,tnk, ∀(l, t) [pil,t] (108)∑
k
am,knk ≤ wm ∀m ∈ N [vm] (109)
xi, xhc, uc, σ ≥ 0 (110)
Since the condition described by (103)-(110) is trivially satisfied when σ = 0 (technically assuming
that network conditions (108)-(109) could be satisfied when xi = xhc = 0), we can normalize, i.e.
set σ := 1 and the condition becomes
max
∀(xi,xhc,uc,nk)∈P
∑
i
(P iQi)xi +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)xhc −
∑
c
Fcuc −Mc(1− u∗c)uc
≤
∑
i
(P iQi)x
∗
i +
∑
c,h∈Hc
(PhcQhc)x
∗
hc −
∑
c
Fcu
∗
c , (111)
where P is the polyhedron defined by the linear conditions (66)-(72), that is the linear relaxation
f (66)-(73). This provides the first result (93).
Now, observe that an optimal solution of the left-hand side of (93) or (111) is always such that
u#c = 0 if u
∗
c = 0, because of the penalty coefficients Mc, or alternatively because u
#
c = 0
corresponds to the optimal dual variable of (76) which is not tight when u∗c = 0. This proves
(94).
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